

# Unix SVR4(OpenSolaris and illumos)Access Control

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# Outlines:

- What is Opensolaris
- What is illumos
- Protection Aim
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- Domain Components
- Matrix of Access Rights.
- Access Control List & Capatibility list
- Access Control Models
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- Command setfacl and getfacl in opensolaris
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# What is OpenSolaris?



- **OpenSolaris** is an open source computer operating system based on Solaris created by **Sun Microsystems**, later a part of **Oracle Corporation**. The first **independent** distribution was released on June 17, 2005.
- **OpenSolaris** is a descendent of the UNIX System V Release 4 (**SVR4**) [2]
- Open sourced subsequent to Solaris 10.
- Includes a variety of free software
- Including popular desktop and server software. [3]
- Slim Software ,automatic install
- Dtrace :Advanced debugging and tuning tool
- ZFS: huge capacity: 256 quadrillion( $10^{15}$ ) ZB (1 ZB = 1 billion TB)

# Unfortunately



Sun was bought by Oracle in 2009, with the acquisition closing in February 2010, Oracle Close OpenSolaris  
It became clear that Oracle had absolutely no interest in Open Source OS [6]


# What is illumos?



- illumos is a free, open source operating system (OS).
- Target products (i.e. storage, virtualization, etc.)
- illumos was developed as a fork of (Unix **SVR4**. etc).
- **Starting in the summer of 2010**, Garrett D'Amore at Nexenta — with help from Rich Lowe, Jason King and others
- Network Server
- ZFS<sup>[7]</sup>
- Dtrace
- Oracle has no plans to work on illumos <sup>[5]</sup>
- Kernel-based virtual machine (KVM) supporting
- **Role Based Access Control** & Least Privilege <sup>[4]</sup>

# Protection

- Protection refers to **a mechanism for controlling** the access of programs, processes, or users to the resources defined by a computer system.
- Protection **ensures that each object** accessed correctly and only by those processes that are allowed to do so.<sup>[11]</sup>



# Protection Goals

- Operating system consists of a **collection of objects**, hardware or software
- **Each object has a unique name** and can be accessed through a well-defined set of operations
- **Protection problem** - ensure that each object is accessed correctly and only by those processes that are allowed to do so

# Principles of Protection:

The role of protection in a computer system is to provide mechanism for the enforcement of the policies governing resource use.

- Mechanism vs Policy
- Mechanisms determine how something will be done; policies decide what will be done
- **Guiding principle** – principle of least privilege
- **Programs, users and systems** should be given just enough privileges to perform their tasks
- **need-to-know principle**: a process should be able to access only those resources that it currently requires to complete its task

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


# Domain Protection

- A process operates within a protection domain, which specifies the resources that the process may access.
- Each domain defines a set of objects and the types of operations that may be invoked on each object.
- The ability to execute an operation on an object is an access right.
- A domain is a collection of access rights, each of which is an ordered pair: <object-name, rights-set>
- Example: If domain D has the access right: <file F, {read, write}>, then a process executing in domain D can only read and write file F.

# Domain Structure

- Access-right =  $\langle \text{object-name, rights-set} \rangle$   
where rights-set is a subset of all valid operations that can be performed on the object.
- Domain = a collection of access-rights
- A protection domain specifies the resources that the process may access [9]



Domains may share access rights.

- A process executing in either  $D_2$  or  $D_3$  can print  $O_4$
- A process must be executing in  $D_1$  to read and write  $O_1$ . Also, only process in  $D_3$  may execute  $O_1$

# Domain Implementation OpenSolaris :

System consists of 2 domains:

- User
  - Supervisor(root)
- 
- Domain = user-ID
  - Domain switching corresponds to user ID switching
  - Domain switching is accomplished through file system as follows:
  - Each file has associated with it a domain bit (setuid bit) and an owner ID
  - .
  - when **setuid bit = off** user A can starts executing a file owned by user B and the the user ID of the process is set to A
- But When **setuid = on**, then user-id is set to owner of the file being executed: B. When execution completes user-id is reset. [9]

# protection



How do we achieve Protection goals in OS

# Access Controls one of These solutions

What is Access control

Determine whether a Subject can perform a requested operation on a Particular object

- Domain/Subject: user, process, etc.
- Operation/right: read, write , execute, etc.
- Object: file, tuple , printer, etc.

# Access Matrix

- The access control matrix is a matrix with  
Each **subject**/domain represented by a **row**  
Each **object** represented by a **column**
- The entry  $M[d, o]$  lists the operations that domain  $d$  may **carry out** on object  $o$  <sup>[12]</sup>

# Access Matrix

object \ domain	$F_1$	$F_2$	$F_3$	printer
$D_1$	read		read	
$D_2$				print
$D_3$		read	execute	
$D_4$	read write		read write	

# C-List and Ac-List

Subject/Domain (User , Processes ,....) – Object (Files, )

**How many Processes ,Users and files in your system?**

Each entity Of matrix consist set of access right


ACL F1 [(D1,r),(D4,rw)]

Most Of Operating System use Access control List Including  
“OpenSolaris”

Capability List D1[(F1,r),(F3,r)]

domain \ object	$F_1$	$F_2$	$F_3$	printer
$D_1$	read		read	
$D_2$				print
$D_3$		read	execute	
$D_4$	read write		read write	





# Access control Models


- Discretionary Access Control
  - Users (typically object owner) can decide permission assignments
- Mandatory Access Control
  - System administrator decides on permission assignments
- Role Based Access control
  - Roles have privilege to access objects And Subject /User Assiaction by That roles

## Comparison of the features for the most common access control models.<sup>[8]</sup>

	<b>DAC</b>	<b>MAC</b>	<b>RBAC</b>
<b>Authorization paradigm</b>	Ownership	Administration	Role
<b>Type of administration</b>	Hard	Medium	Easy
<b>Flexibility</b>	High	Low	High
<b>Good for distributed environments</b>	Yes	No	Yes
<b>Widely used</b>	Yes	No	Yes
<b>Handles dynamic changes</b>	Yes	No	Yes
<b>Handles task-based control</b>	No	No	Yes
<b>Level of security</b>	Low	High	High
<b>Level of assurance</b>	Low	High	High
<b>Incorporates easily into technologies (e.g., web services)</b>	No	No	Yes
<b>Able to express other models</b>	No	No	Yes

# illumos Used Role Based Access Control(RBAC)

illumos: RBAC - Role Based Access Control, for granting least-privilege access to processes and users.



# Role Based Access control

Subjects are assigned Roles which have predefined associated permissions to perform certain operation on the objects.

The main features of RBAC are

- Centralized & Decentralized at once
- Permissions are enforced through Access Control List (ACL) attached to objects

# Discretionary Access Control in OpenSolaris

- In this show you will get familiar with the implementation of DAC AC model in OpenSolaris with the ZFS file system.
- traditional read=write=execute right for ACL entries, and similar to Windows, in OpenSolaris we have many more different permissions (e.g. append, read acl, etc.). For a some list refer to Table 3.1. In Linux ACLs are congured and viewed with the commands setfacl and getfacl - for example the [11]

Attribute	Description
execute	Execute a file
delete_child	Delete a file within a directory
read_attributes	Read basic attributes (non-ACL) of a file
write_attributes	Write basic attributes to a file or directory
delete	Delete a file
read_acl	Read the ACL
write_acl	Modify the ACL (needed to use chmod or setfacl)
write_owner	Use chown to change ownership of a file
synchronize	Access file locally via synchronous reads and writes

# Some DAC In OpenSolaris

## Setting an ACL on a File

```
$ setfacl -s user::rw-,group::r--,other:---,mask:rw-,user:george:rw- ch1.doc
$ ls -l
total 124
-rw-r-----+ 1 nathan  sysadmin  34816 Nov 11 14:16 ch1.doc
-rw-r--r--   1 nathan  sysadmin  20167 Nov 11 14:16 ch2.doc
-rw-r--r--   1 nathan  sysadmin   8192 Nov 11 14:16 notes
$ getfacl ch1.doc
# file: ch1.doc
# owner: nathan
# group: sysadmin
user::rw-
user:george:rw-   #effective:rw-
group::r--       #effective:r--
mask:rw-
other:---
```

## Checking If a File Has an ACL

```
$ ls -l ch1.doc
-rwxr-----+ 1 nathan  sysadmin  167 Nov 11 11:13 ch1.doc
```

# Some DAC In OpenSolaris

The following example sets the file owner permissions to read/write/execute, file group permissions to read only, other permissions to none, and the ACL mask permissions to read on the ch2.doc file. In addition, the user george is given read/write permissions; however, due to the ACL mask, the effective permissions for george are read only.

```
$ setfacl -s u::7,g::4,o:0,m:4,u:george:7 ch2.doc
$ getfacl ch2.doc
# file: ch2.doc
# owner: nathan
# group: sysadmin
user::rwx
user:george:rwx           #effective:r--
group::r--                #effective:r--
mask:r--
other:---
```



# Some DAC In OpenSolaris

- **Example--Copying an ACL**
- The following example copies the ACL on ch2.doc to ch3.doc.

```
getfacl ch2.doc | setfacl -f - ch3.doc
```

- **Example--Deleting ACL Entries on a File**

The following example deletes the user george from the ch4.doc file

```
$ setfacl -d user:george ch4.doc
```


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# Some DAC In OpenSolaris

- **Examples--Displaying ACL Entries for a File**
- The following example shows all the ACL entries for the ch1.doc file. The #effective: note beside the user and group entries indicates what the permissions are after being modified by the ACL mask.

```
$ getfacl ch1.doc
# file: ch1.doc
# owner: nathan
# group: sysadmin
user::rw-
user:george:r--          #effective:r--
group::rw-              #effective:rw-
mask:rw-
other:---
```

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**Thank You For All**